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For Members Only:
Local and Robust Group Management in DTNs
Abstract
Effectively utilizing groups in delay tolerant networks
(DTNs) can both improve the throughput of unicast rout-
ing protocols and open the door for a wide range of
paradigms, such as anycast and multicast. Unfortu-
nately, in DTN environments, there is no centralized en-
tity that can quickly and reliably transmit group member-
ship lists, and hence group information must be dissemi-
nated through unreliable and potentially malicious nodes.
In this paper, we propose a local and robust group infor-
mation dissemination and consolidation protocol, called
MembersOnly, that both quickly and accurately transmits
group membership information to all nodes in the net-
work, even if multiple malicious nodes attempt to disrupt
the process. We show via analysis and simulations that
MembersOnly is able to withstand multiple types of at-
tacks, with only very limited periods of vulnerability that
disappear relatively quickly. This is in contrast to current
techniques that cannot withstand many of these attacks,
resulting in quick and thorough corruption of group mem-
bership lists. In addition, we show via simulation that
even the most basic routing protocols can gain a perfor-
mance advantage when using MembersOnly.
1 Introduction
Groups are naturally found in many environments.
Such grouping is especially common in delay and dis-
ruption tolerant networks (DTNs), where much of the
communication and mobility is based on human interac-
tion [4, 8, 20]. In these environments, the composition
of groups may be based on many different abstractions,
including roles (i.e., firefighters or police officers [16]),
social networks (i.e., friends communicating using wire-
less mobile devices [4]), or geographical closeness (i.e.,
coworkers who meet every day for meetings). Knowl-
edge of such groups can greatly enhance many aspects of
communication in DTNs, including unicast [10], anycast
and multicast routing, information access control, and
privacy. In particular, it has been shown that contacting
a particular node’s group or affiliation is an effective and
efficient first step towards contacting the node itself [10].
However, due to the intermittently connected nature of
DTNs, maintaining and disseminating such group infor-
mation is challenging, especially in the presence of mali-
cious attackers.
The successful enhancement of DTN communication
through the use of group information requires that nodes
throughout the network be aware of the membership lists
for all groups. While such group membership manage-
ment is not difficult in connected environments, heavy
partitioning and the lack of readily available end-to-end
paths in DTNs break centralized membership services,
just like they break traditional routing [11]. Instead,
group information must be disseminated through the net-
work using DTN-specific mechanisms that leverage con-
tacts between nodes that meet. Unfortunately, the re-
liance on contact-based dissemination and the presence
of malicious or faulty nodes may result in inaccurate
knowledge of group membership. While cryptographic
techniques (i.e., PKI [14]) could provide proof of group
membership, such techniques are not currently feasible in
the intermittently connected environment of DTNs due
to the lack of availability of a trust anchor. The main
challenge then lies in ensuring accuracy of disseminated
group membership lists.
Group membership management in DTNs can be bro-
ken into four components: group creation, group in-
formation propagation, group information consolidation,
and group-assisted routing. During group creation, mem-
bers of a group learn about their membership in the group.
At this point, nodes outside of the group are not aware of
the group’s membership, or perhaps even of the group
itself. Once the group has been formed, group mem-
bers propagate the group’s membership list throughout
the network. Simultaneously, faulty and malicious nodes
may be propagating inaccurate membership lists. Non-
member nodes collect and consolidate all group mem-
bership lists as they receive them, locally resolving any
conflicting information about a group’s membership list.
Finally, the resolved group membership list can be used
to support routing and other services in the DTN. While
there exists some work on group creation and group rout-
ing, current approaches ignore propagation and consoli-
dation issues and do not consider the presence of mali-
cious nodes tampering with group membership informa-
tion.
Current approaches to disseminating group member-
ship information in DTNs epidemically [23] propagate
the information and, working under the assumption of
a completely trustworthy environment, do not have any
mechanism to handle conflicting information [9, 10]. In
stead of resolving any conflicting information, these ap-
proaches typically default to selecting the newest infor-
mation as truth. Unfortunately, this simplistic approach
is inappropriate in many DTN environments, especially
in the presence of malicious nodes. Essentially, such
approaches form inaccurate group membership informa-
tion, and so, result in ineffective routing. We show that
these approaches actually break down in the presence of
even a small number of malicious nodes. The main prob-
lem with these approaches stems from the lack of quick
and robust propagation and consolidation.
The main contribution of our work comes from the de-
sign, analysis and evaluation of MembersOnly, our group
membership management protocol for DTNs that enables
accurate group membership dissemination, even in the
presence of multiple malicious nodes, through effective
distribution and consolidation of group membership lists.
The main strength of MembersOnly comes from the lack
of reliance on any type of cryptographic techniques, mak-
ing it an appropriate system for networks where groups
are quickly created and destroyed and where centralized
authorities do not exist. Given a set of partially conflict-
ing membership lists, MembersOnly builds off of tech-
niques from data mining to establish a local view of group
membership. Compared to current methods, Member-
sOnly provides more accurate local views during con-
vergence and quickly converges to very accurate views.
Given that the maintenance of group membership lists is
susceptible to various types of attacks on the consistency
of a group’s membership list, we show both analytically
and through simulations that MembersOnly provides ac-
curate results, despite the presence of moderate levels of
malicious nodes. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of
accurate group membership information through the eval-
uation of a simple group-based routing protocol, showing
that MembersOnly can significantly improve routing per-
formance.
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides an overview of groups in DTNs includ-
ing related work in the area. Section 3 presents Mem-
bersOnly in-depth, along with the relevant mathemati-
cal intuition behind it. Section 4 provides a mathemat-
ical analysis of MembersOnly under multiple types of at-
tacks, and give insights into how parameters should be
tuned. Section 5 presents a comprehensive evaluation
that compares MembersOnly to other currently popular
protocols in both friendly and malicious environments, as
well as explores its parameter space. Section 6 explores
how MembersOnly, as opposed to currently popular but
vulnerable systems, improves the routing performance of
even the most basic routing protocols. Finally, we con-
clude in Section 7.
2 Groups in DTNs
Routing in DTNs is currently an active and difficult
research problem [1, 2, 5, 7, 13, 15, 17, 21]. While lever-
aging group information in DTNs can have a significant
impact on routing performance [10], current approaches
consider all nodes in the network to be trustworthy, and so
assume all group membership information to be trusted.
Unfortunately, even a small number of malicious nodes
can wreck havoc with membership lists if left unchecked.
To understand the depth of this problem, in this section,
we discuss the process of group membership manage-
ment in DTNs given the four components: group cre-
ation, group information propagation, group information
consolidation, and group-assisted routing.
2.1 Group Creation
Every group is formed based on some common feature
of the individual nodes, including geography, node roles,
and social affiliations. In some cases, groups are created
in advance; in other cases, they are rather spontaneous.
Take, for instance, a disaster scenario where nodes fall
into roles such as firefighter, police officer, ambulance,
and civilian. The nodes of one particular role could be
thought of as a group. Another example is a group of
nodes that are currently or often in close geographic prox-
imity, and decide to form a group to better connect them-
selves to other nodes. This way, nodes wishing to con-
tact a particular node in the group need only find a single
member of the group, and be relatively confident that an
intermediate node will meet the destination sometime in
the future. Overall, the goal of group creation is to form
such groups and allow all nodes of the group to know they
are a part of it. Furthermore, group creation also informs
group members of other nodes that are part of their group.
The specific algorithms used for group creation de-
pend on the type of group. For example, geographic
groups can be created using centralized algorithms for
community detection [19] or distributed versions of cen-
tralized algorithms [10]. In geographic groups, group
centrality is important, and approaches such as weighted
network analysis [18] can be implemented in a distributed
fashion [10]. On the other hand, some dynamic groups
rely on physical contact and verbal agreement, and so
group creation is mostly out-of-band. An interesting
paradigm would be to create per-person social groups,
where each person’s group represents their social net-
work. Everyone would also be a member of all of their
friends’ groups, resulting in a large number of overlap-
ping groups that are each highly individualistic.
Although group creation is a interesting problem,
in this paper, we focus primarily on role-based or
geographic-based groups where nodes initially know
which groups they are in and group membership does
not change. However, our algorithms do support dy-
namic groups where members might not initially know
all other members of the group and where group mem-
bership changes over time. To demonstrate this, we eval-
uate our algorithms during convergence, which gives us
insight into how these algorithms behave in the face of
dynamic groups.
2.2 Group Information Propagation
Once nodes know which groups they are in and who
else is in these groups, they can start to propagate group
membership information throughout the network. Such
propagation enables nodes that are not a member of a
group to gather information about the membership list
of that group. Propagation is a key component of group
membership management, since the consolidation algo-
rithms discussed next calculate their membership lists
based on the information collected during propagation.
However, effective propagation faces two challenges:
convergence speed and malicious nodes.
The quickest way to propagate group membership in-
formation is for all nodes to epidemically disseminate
all group information they are aware of. On the other
hand, nodes could be more conservative and only dissem-
inate a list of the groups to which they belong [9, 10].
While epidemic approaches are clearly optimal in terms
of propagation speed, at least when resources are not lim-
ited, they are extremely vulnerable to many kinds of at-
tacks. If nodes can send unrestricted amounts of informa-
tion about any group, then malicious nodes can convince
non-malicious nodes to send false information as well.
This effectively increases the number of nodes spreading
the false information in an unbounded fashion, making
it difficult for any consolidation protocol to produce ac-
curate results. Unfortunately, the more conservative ap-
proaches are very slow at propagating information across
a network and, without appropriate consolidation, are still
vulnerable to some types of attacks. We evaluate propa-
gation speed for both of these approaches in Section 5
and discuss the propagation attacks that can compromise
consolidation in Section 4.
Although the speed of epidemic approaches is highly
desirable, we show that limiting the nodes to only sending
information about groups that they are members of lim-
its the spread of false information, providing a good ba-
sis for our consolidation protocol to achieve a high level
of protection against malicious nodes. Furthermore, this
membership-based propagation technique still dissemi-
nates information quickly.
2.3 Group Information Consolidation
Since group membership is propagated through the
network, nodes collect multiple, potentially conflicting,
pieces of information about each group. The nodes must
consolidate this information into a single local view of
each group’s membership list. This local view can then
be utilized by the routing protocol for use with routing
decisions. In DTN environments, there is very little ap-
plicable work on consolidating conflicting information.
Therefore, we turn to the field of data mining and analy-
sis. The TruthFinder system [25] solves a similar problem
by first obtaining a set of “facts” about “objects” from
multiple online servers, and then attempting to consoli-
date these potentially conflicting facts to determine the
truth about the object. For example, to learn the true au-
thor list of a particular book, TruthFinder first contacts
multiple servers, such as Borders and Barnes & Noble,
and obtains an author list, or fact, about the particular
book from each one. Using these facts, TruthFinder at-
tempts to consolidate them into a single author list.
Unfortunately, TruthFinder cannot be easily adapted
to fit a DTN environment. First, TruthFinder assumes that
all of the servers, or fact providers, are always available
and can be readily contacted, and hence gathers all facts
before running the consolidation step. DTN nodes have
at most only a very small subset of the entire network
in communication range. Even if TruthFinder could be
adapted to work in a disconnected environment, the al-
gorithms in TruthFinder are designed to never omit any
information from the final result (such as a particular au-
thor), and hence result in a relatively high false positive
rate. For instance, a fact containing a single author pos-
itively reinforces a fact containing that author plus an-
other author, and so facts with more authors tend to have
more reinforcement. While acceptable for TruthFinder’s
purposes, a malicious node should not be able to easily
append itself to a membership list.
To support group information consolidation in DTN
environments, we present an on-line algorithm that col-
lects group membership information from each node it
meets and consolidates it on-the-fly without requiring
contact with any centralized server. Our algorithm con-
tinually refines its decisions as more information be-
comes available, quickly converging to very accurate de-
cisions about group membership. The combination of
this algorithm with our membership-based propagation
approach enables successful defense against many types
of attacks, even in the presence of a large number of ma-
licious nodes.
2.4 Group-Assisted Routing
Accurate group membership information can be used
for many services, but the most obvious is group-assisted
routing. For example, BubbleRap [10] utilizes group
membership information to improve standard unicast
routing. In essence, BubbleRap attempts to transmit a
message to nodes that are part of the message destina-
tion’s group, assuming that members of the same group
have a high probability of contacting one another. Group
information can also be used as a foundation for build-
ing anycast routing systems, where the goal is to reach at
least one member of a particular group [6]. In the pres-
ences of faults and malicious users, the accuracy of the
group membership information can have a large impact
on the performance of any routing protocol.
Although we do not focus on routing protocols in this
paper, we evaluate the effect of the accuracy of group
membership information on a simple anycast routing pro-
tocol, which can be used as a building block for more
advanced protocols. Essentially, more accurate member-
ship information, even during convergence, significantly
improves even a simple anycast routing protocol. As part
of our future research, we are investigating the use of
group membership information in unicast, multicast and
anycast routing protocols, as well as other group-based
services.
3 MembersOnly
The ability to quickly and accurately distribute group
information opens up the door for many group-based ser-
vices. In DTN environments, both unreliable links and
malicious nodes make this a challenging problem. In
this section, we present MembersOnly, a local and robust
propagation and consolidation protocol that provides ac-
curate views of groups even in the presence of malicious
nodes. The propagation component, responsible for the
quick delivery of information, is first explored followed
by the consolidation component, responsible for merging
the information obtained locally and filtering out mali-
cious information.
3.1 Membership Dissemination
Effective propagation of membership information re-
quires quick distribution while using mechanisms that
support high integrity of the group membership infor-
mation. To achieve this goal, MembersOnly takes a
membership-based approach: nodes propagate group
membership lists only for groups of which they are mem-
bers. In other words, a set of membership lists, one for
each group a node is a member of, is transmitted to ev-
ery contact that node makes. This approach has two ma-
jor benefits. First, it provides enough information for
quick propagation, as opposed to transmitting only a list
of groups the node is a member of. Second, it does not
attempt to transmit everything, giving consolidation pro-
tocols the ability to filter out inaccuracies, as explained in
Section 2.2.
Duplication is expected in DTNs, and hence nodes
may receive multiple membership lists from the same
node. Since membership lists are constantly evolving,
the newest list should always be used. Furthermore, if a
membership list is not replaced with a newer one from
the same node for some time, it is possible to assign a
weighting factor to account for aging. We leave the aging
of membership lists for future work.
The membership-based propagation approach of
MembersOnly, in conjunction with its consolidation pro-
tocol, which we describe next, enables quick and accu-
rate group information distribution, even in the presence
of multiple malicious nodes.
3.2 Consolidation of Membership Lists
While MembersOnly enables fast propagation of
membership lists, its true power lies in its ability to fil-
ter out malicious information. At any given time, a node
has a set of, potentially old, membership lists for some
or all groups in the network. MembersOnly leverages
the availability of these multiple lists to build confidence
levels for each potential member of a group, enabling
well-informed consolidation that filters suggestions from
malicious nodes, as illustrated in Figure 1. The goal of
the consolidation component is to locally create a sin-
gle high-confidence membership list for each group in the
network. This high-confidence list contains members that
the node believes are really part of the group.
During consolidation, MembersOnly looks at all rec-
ommendations about membership for each potential
member of a group and computes a confidence score
about that member. This score is based on positive ev-
idence extracted from all membership lists that claim that
the node is part of the group and negative evidence ex-
tracted from all membership lists that do not have that
node listed as part of the group. To reconcile these dif-
ferences of opinion, MembersOnly calculates a function
of the difference between the strength of the positive ev-
idence and the strength of the negative evidence. If the
result from this function is greater than a threshold, the
node is place on the high-confidence list for that group.
Since malicious nodes may wrongfully inflate both the
positive and the negative evidence, this function must be
designed to filter out malicious evidence.
Figure 1. Consolidation Component
The MembersOnly consolidation component achieves
high-confidence membership lists as follows. Each node
n collects a set of membership lists, L, about a group G.
Each entry on a membership list looks like “node m is a
member of group G”. Node n then computes a list, H,
that contains, from n’s point of view, all high confidence
members of group G. To determine the confidence of a
node m’s membership in G, MembersOnly creates two
subsets of L, Lm and Lm¯ as follows:
Lm = {l ∈ L|m ∈ l},
Lm¯ = {l ∈ L|m 6∈ l},
where Xm = |Lm|, the total number of lists m is found on,
provides the positive evidence for believing that m is a
member of G and Xm¯ = |Lm¯|, the total number of lists m
is not found on, represents the negative evidence.
Node n can now combine this positive and negative ev-
idence to determine a confidence value about m’s mem-
bership in G. Intuitively, the confidence can be captured
by the difference between functions of the positive and
negative evidence. To capture this, we build off of tech-
niques used in data mining [25], where confidence should
start low and quickly rise only after enough supporting
evidence is obtained. This resulting S-shaped curve can
be generalized by the popular Sigmoid Function [24], il-
lustrated in Figure 2, and defined as
Y =
1
1 + e−X
.
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Figure 2. Standard Sigmoid Function
Applying the Sigmoid function, the strength of the
positive evidence for node m can be computed as:
1
1 + e−(Xm−α)
,
and the strength of the negative evidence can be com-
puted as:
1
1 + e−(τ·Xm¯−α)
.
To support flexibility in our model, we have added the
parameter α to generalize the standard Sigmoid function.
Changing α shifts the function along the x-axis, such that
Y = 0.5 when X = α. Furthermore, we add a weighted
factor, τ, to the negative evidence. The effect of these pa-
rameters on the resulting confidence levels are described
in detail shortly.
The total confidence about a node m’s membership in
group G can be found by taking the difference between
the positive and negative evidence. Since it is unclear
what negative confidence means, we ensure that the con-
fidence does not fall below 0.
C(m) = max
{
1
1 + e−(Xm−α)
−
1
1 + e−(τ·Xm¯−α)
,0
}
C(m) gives an indication of how confident node n should
be in node m’s membership. After node n computes this
value for all possible members of a group, it selects the
high-confident nodes to be part of the consolidated list H:
H = {m|C(m)≥ γ},
where γ is a system defined parameter that determines
an accuracy threshold for the system. Essentially, if the
difference between the strength of the positive evidence
and the strength of the negative evidence is greater than
the threshold γ, the membership in question is accepted.
This process is repeated for all groups the node is aware
of, and results in a consolidated list H for each group.
The final set of H values can then be passed to the routing
protocol.
Since the lack of a member in a valid list can be used to
counter the presence of a member in a malicious list, the
parameter τ ∈ [0,1], is used as a weighting factor for the
negative evidence. Essentially, τ scales up or down the
amount of negative evidence needed to counter positive
evidence. If τ is close to 1, then negative evidence is given
the same importance as positive evidence, and hence, less
negative evidence is needed to doubt an node’s member-
ship. On the other hand, if τ is close to 0, then more neg-
ative evidence is needed to cast doubt. Setting τ properly
impacts how a system reacts to different types of attacks.
In Section 4, we explore, via mathematical analysis, how
different types of attacks can affect the system, and how
to appropriately set τ to counter them.
Another important parameter is α. The smaller α is,
the faster the propagation speed is when there are no at-
tackers in the network, because a smaller amount of pos-
itive evidence is needed to reach γ. However, as α gets
smaller, it has a negative impact on the appropriate set-
ting of τ, which is detrimental to the system in regards to
attacks. We recommend setting α to around the square
root of the group size, since this supports relatively fast
propagation, while being large enough to not negatively
impact τ. The interplay between these two parameters is
explored in Section 4.
The power of this model is that it is highly param-
eterized and hence compatible with a large range of
group sizes and characteristics. We explore many of
these parameters and how they effect system performance
throughout the rest of this paper.
4 Model Analysis with Attackers
The primary goal of MembersOnly is to provide quick
and accurate group information to all nodes in the net-
work, even in the presence of multiple malicious nodes.
In this section, we present two high level classes of at-
tacks and show, via mathematical analysis, how Mem-
bersOnly can be set to defend against them.
4.1 Potential Attacks
We assume malicious nodes have similar abilities to
normal nodes, in that they can send and receive any in-
formation they want during a contact. We now briefly de-
scribe two generic attacks, an addition attack and a dele-
tion attack, that give good insight into how attackers can
affect and exploit different systems.
The goal of the addition attack is to convince as many
nodes as possible that the attacking node is part of some
or all groups in the network. Therefore, attackers must
convince normal nodes that they are valid entries on the
local membership lists for those groups. If successful,
attackers will be members of many groups and will be
considered good intermediate nodes for routing to those
groups. This positions the attackers to launch powerful
black hole attacks, or other more sophisticated attacks.
To demonstrate the effect of this attack, in Section 5 we
instantiate a version of the addition attack where each at-
tacker appends itself to all membership lists, and trans-
mits this new information during contacts.
The goal of the deletion attack is to convince as many
nodes as possible that one or more specific valid mem-
bers of a group, or multiple groups, are in fact not mem-
bers. Attackers must therefore provide enough negative
evidence about a node to cast doubt about it’s member-
ship in a group. Deleting members from membership
lists can severely hinder routing performance. Essen-
tially, a denial-of-service attack is launched, since nodes
hold data until they meet a member of a particular group.
To demonstrate the effect of this attack, in Section 5 we
instantiate a version of the deletion attack where attackers
simply broadcast blank membership lists for all groups
they are currently aware of.
These two types of attacks represent building blocks
for more devastating attacks. Therefore, we evaluate how
well MembersOnly and other current systems react to and
handle these types of attacks. Note that we do not al-
low malicious nodes to perform Sybil attacks. If we gave
them this capability, they could constantly send multiple
membership lists for the same group under fake names,
artificially inflating the chance of a node believing that at
least one of the fake names is really on the list. Solving
the Sybil problem in delay tolerant networks, without a
centralized system, is a very difficult problem that we do
not attempt to solve with this work.
4.2 Model Analysis with Attackers
Given that malicious nodes have the ability to perform
both addition and deletion attacks, we now perform an
analysis of our model to determine how best to defend
against these attacks. Recall that if
1
1 + e−(Xm−α)
−
1
1 + e−(τ·Xm¯−α)
≥ γ
then node n is confident to add m to the high confidence
list H for group G. Also recall that if malicious nodes
perform a deletion attack, their goal is to inflate the neg-
ative evidence against m enough to drop the confidence
value below γ. Hence, to protect against this attack, τ, the
negative evidence weighting factor, should be decreased.
This gives less weight to the false negative evidence the
attackers are providing. In contrast, if malicious nodes
perform an addition attack, their goal is to inflate the pos-
itive evidence for their own false information, to bring
the confidence value above γ. To protect against this, τ
should be increased, so true group members can provide
the necessary negative evidence against the false positive
evidence.
It is clear that if a system only wishes to defend against
deletion attacks, τ should be 0. Similarly, if a system only
wishes to defend against addition attacks, τ should be 1.
However, it is possible to set τ to defend against both ad-
dition and deletion attacks simultaneously by keeping it
within a valid range. Larger ranges of τ are best, since
this gives more flexibility in the actual choice for τ for a
given system. To find the outer limits of this range, we
analyze the steady state case, when every node has met
every other node, to ensure that both types of attacks are,
in the long run, completely defeated. We assume, for sim-
plicity, that attackers cannot convince actual group mem-
bers of changes in their own groups. While in practice
this may not be true, particularly if nodes can join and
leave groups without informing all group members of the
action, it provides a good approximation.
In the MembersOnly group information propagation
component, the only way a node can obtain information
about a group is to meet a member of that group (or, at
least a node that claims to be a member of that group).
Given M, the total number of true members of a particu-
lar group, and A, the total number of attackers in the net-
work attacking that group, the total amount of possible
evidence for or against a node’s membership is M + A.
For a deletion attack in the long run, nodes outside
of the group obtain A recommendations against and M
recommendations for the node in question. To protect
against this attack, the confidence value computed by
the non-member node should be greater than γ. In other
words,
1
1 + e−(M−α)
−
1
1 + e−(τ·A−α)
≥ γ.
Solving for τ, we find that to protect against the deletion
attack,
τ ≤
1
A
·
[
α− ln
(
−(γ+ eα−M + γ · eα−M)
γ+ γ · eα−M −1
)]
.
Now consider attackers launching an addition attack
against a particular group, where the goal is to get non-
members to believe that the malicious nodes are actually
part of the group. In the long run, the nodes outside
of the group will have, in the worst case, A recommen-
dations for the entries and M recommendations against
them. This is analogous to the previous inequality, and
hence to protect against the addition attack,
τ ≥
1
M
·
[
α− ln
(
−(γ+ eα−A + γ · eα−A)
γ+ γ · eα−A−1
)]
.
It is immediately clear that if the number of attackers
is greater than the number of nodes in the group, Mem-
bersOnly cannot defend against both types of attacks si-
multaneously. In this case, the user would have to choose
which attack they were most concerned about, and adjust
τ accordingly.
To clarify, consider the following example, which we
also use for our evaluations. Assume a group of size of
M = 45 and γ = 0.75.
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Figure 3. Valid ranges for τ
When choosing τ, it is important to choose a value
that is within the valid range for the maximum expected
number of malicious nodes in the network, to ensure that
the system is within the valid τ range at all times. Fig-
ure 3 shows the valid ranges of τ as the number of at-
tackers varies from 10 to 45, as indicated by our previous
analysis. This figure shows that MembersOnly is able
to defend against both addition and deletion attacks at
the same time, as long as the number of attackers is less
than the group size of the group in question. However, as
the number of malicious nodes increases, the valid range
of τ shrinks. It is also interesting to note that as α de-
creases, the ranges become smaller, which is undesirable.
However, as α increases, the propagation speed increases,
which is desirable. We recommend setting α to be around
the square root of the group size, as this allows for both
quick propagation speeds and large ranges of τ.
It is important to remember that larger ranges for τ
are beneficial since they allow for more leeway for er-
rors in predictions of the number of malicious nodes and
the group size for the particular group in question. Fur-
thermore, larger ranges make it easier to defend against
the attacks in practice, where a group’s members them-
selves may be swayed by malicious evidence. We use
the values of τ derived from this analysis in the following
evaluation section to show that MembersOnly can defend
against both types of attacks in practice.
5 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is two-fold. First, we eval-
uate the propagation speed and attack resistance of Mem-
bersOnly in comparison to existing approaches and show
that MembersOnly enables fast propagation and is ex-
tremely resistant to attacks, even in the presence of mul-
tiple malicious nodes. Second, we evaluate the effect of
the parameters τ and α on the behavior of MembersOnly.
5.1 Evaluation Setup
For comparison, we use the two propagation ap-
proaches discussed in Section 2: CopyMyGroups, where
nodes transmit a list of every group they are members of
to every contact they meet, and CopyEverything, where
nodes transmit all group membership information they
know to every contact they meet. For both of these pro-
tocols, the consolidation component is to simply take the
newest version of any membership information as truth.
Average group completion percentage captures the
speed and pervasiveness of group membership list prop-
agation by tracking the completion percentage of a group
over all nodes and all groups. Note that all nodes have ac-
cess to an oracle with all correct group membership lists
strictly for the purpose of metric computation. This met-
ric will increase as soon as any node becomes aware of
any subset of members for any group. The higher the
metric’s value is, the faster the system is at propagating
group information. Both the normal propagation speed
and the deletion attack effectiveness are measured using
this metric. It is appropriate for the deletion attack, since
goal of attackers is to delete as many members from every
local membership list as possible, hindering propagation.
For the addition attack, the average percentage of cor-
rupt groups captures how corrupt local membership lists
are. A conservative approach is taken to say that a node’s
view of a group membership list is corrupt if that node
(falsely) believes at least one attacker is actually a mem-
ber of the group. It is the attackers’ goal to corrupt as
many groups as possible, driving the metric up. Hence,
the lower the metric’s value is, the better the system is at
protecting against the addition attack.
All metrics are evaluated over time. Each of the eval-
uated systems eventually converges to either 0 or 1 for
all metrics, and therefore it is most interesting to see how
the curves progress over time, and how they look relative
to one another. The exact time values are not as impor-
tant as the characteristics of the curves, since these values
change with properties of the network such as movement
speed, transmission range, number of nodes, etc. Essen-
tially, even though attackers may lose out in the end, there
can be periods of vulnerability where attackers can make
gains.
All simulations use the ONE [12] simulator and the
random waypoint model [3], with nodes moving between
3 and 7 meters per second. There are a total of 250 nodes
divided into 5 non-overlapping groups of either 50 nodes
(if there are no attackers), 47 nodes (if there are 15 attack-
ers), or 45 nodes (if there are 25 attackers). The trans-
mission range of each node is 250m and the world size
is 3.5 km x 3.5 km. All data points are the average of
10 runs with 95% confidence intervals surrounding them.
There are data points every 50 simulation seconds; how-
ever, many markers have been omitted for clarity. For all
simulations, γ = 0.75.
5.2 Comparative Evaluation
To understand the impact of the propagation algo-
rithm, MembersOnly is compared to both CopyMy-
Groups and CopyEverything by looking at membership
list propagation speed as well as the effectiveness of the
addition and deletion attacks. The number of malicious
nodes, if any, in the simulations are denoted by paren-
theses next to the system name. The two numbers next
to MembersOnly represent the parameters α and τ. As
previously described, α = 7 for these simulations, which
constrains the choice of τ from around 0.13 to around
0.24, which handles up to 25 attackers. Therefore, we
chose τ = 0.2.
Propagation algorithms aim to spread membership
lists throughout the network. As expected, CopyEvery-
thing shows the optimal speed since it epidemically dis-
seminates all information (see Figure 4(a)). Virtually
all nodes are correctly aware of all membership lists in
around 250 seconds. In contrast, CopyMyGroups, is rela-
tively slow since it only transmits a list of groups a node
is a part of during each contact, not a membership list
of those groups. Therefore, to reach 100%, every node
would have to come in contact with every other node.
By the end of the simulation, at 5,000 seconds, this ap-
proach reaches only around 85% completion. Member-
sOnly, which transmits group membership lists for all
groups a node is a part of, starts off slightly slower than
the other systems since, for security reasons, it waits for
sufficient evidence before accepting information. How-
ever, after a sufficient amount of evidence is collected,
nodes propagate the information very quickly.
Once attackers are introduced into the system, it is in-
teresting to consider the average percentage of corrupt
groups. For the addition attack (see Figure 4(b)), the
higher the percentage, the more penetration the attack-
ers gain, and hence the less resistant the system is to the
attack. CopyEverything is slightly worse than CopyMy-
Groups. However, both are terrible at resisting the addi-
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Figure 5. (a) Group Completion, (b) Addition Attack, (c) Deletion Attack
tion attack since the attack nodes persistently claim to be
part of every group they know of. When a node meets
enough attack nodes, it is convinced that at least some
of the attack nodes are part of the group. This node then
propagates that false information, convincing other nodes
to do the same. This degenerating process is quite fast for
both systems. In contrast, MembersOnly is more careful
and considers the absence of information (i.e., a mem-
bership list without an attacker on it) as evidence against
that information. Hence, the attackers can gain a tempo-
rary advantage with some nodes. However, in the long
run, the attackers will not be able to overcome the honest
nodes. The period of time where the metric is non-zero
is a vulnerability period where some nodes wrongfully
believe attackers are part of a group. As expected, the
duration and prominence of this period increases as the
number of attack nodes increases. However, even with
25 attackers, MembersOnly keeps the vulnerability pe-
riod limited, and eventually the percentage goes to zero.
Finally, in the deletion attack, the attackers try to dis-
rupt the propagation of group membership lists. With
CopyEverything, membership lists quickly propagate and
some gains are made (see Figure 4(c)). However, attack-
ers continuously promoting blank membership lists even-
tually cause a larger and larger number of nodes to believe
that the membership list is actually blank. This results in
the percentage going to zero, indicating the attack was
successful. Interestingly, in CopyMyGroups the attack is
not only unsuccessful, but useless since CopyMyGroups
is immune from this attack because only a list of groups
is propagated, never a membership list of those groups.
Hence, there is no way for an attack node to convince
another node of any membership list, let alone a blank
one. The result of the attack on MembersOnly is simply
a shift in time of the curve. The attackers are able to con-
vince nodes to delay accepting membership lists as true
for some time. However, eventually nodes running Mem-
bersOnly receive enough evidence from honest nodes to
override the evidence given by attack nodes. Therefore,
attackers simply delay the inevitable.
In summary, although CopyEverything is extremely
fast, it is also extremely susceptible to both addition and
deletion attacks. While CopyMyGroups is immune from
deletion attacks, it is very susceptible to addition attacks
and also too slow for practical use. In comparison, Mem-
bersOnly is both resistant to addition and deletion attacks,
and can propagate group membership at a quick speed.
5.3 Parameter Evaluation
The parameters of MembersOnly determine both the
propagation speed and resiliency to attack. Particularly,
there is an interesting interplay between α and τ, which
was explored in the analysis from Section 4. Recall, that
as α decreases, the propagation speed should increase,
since nodes can more quickly reach the threshold γ. How-
ever, as the analysis shows, this also decreases the valid
range of τ. If τ is too low, addition attacks will succeed,
and if τ is too high, deletion attacks will succeed.
When there are no attackers in the network, smaller
values of α result in faster group information propaga-
tion due to the a smaller amount of positive evidence re-
quired to reach γ (see Figure 5(a)). With addition attacks,
MembersOnly successfully defends against the attack for
all values of α (see Figure 5(b)), because τ = 0.2, which
is always greater than the minimum τ value, according to
the model. Recall that lower values of α actually drop the
range numerically, while shrinking it, and hence lower
values of α, for the same τ, result in better protection
against an addition attack. However, in the event of a
deletion attack, the value of τ is greater than the maxi-
mum τ value for α = 3 and α = 5, according to the analy-
sis. Essentially, MembersOnly cannot defend against the
deletion attack for these two values of α, while it can for
α = 7 (see Figure 5(c)).
6 Group-based Routing
Obtaining quick and accurate group information about
a network opens the door for a wider range and greater ef-
ficiency of routing protocols. One immediate result is the
ability to efficiently perform anycast routing, which at-
tempts to deliver a message to at least one member of a
particular group [6]. Anycast routing is useful as a stand-
alone routing technique for many scenarios. For instance,
in emergency response networks, it may be more benefi-
cial for an injured person to contact any emergency re-
sponder rather than a particular one. It is also useful as
a means to improve unicast routing by first anycasting a
message to a member of the destination’s group, and then
unicasting it from there.
To understand the impact of the accuracy of group
membership on routing protocols, we evaluate a basic
single-copy anycast routing protocol that utilizes group
information to make routing decisions. We show that
routing protocol performance is very dependent on the
underlying group membership management. By using
MembersOnly, as opposed to current popular systems,
routing performance can be improved by close to 8% un-
der certain attack scenarios. For simplicity, a single-copy
protocol was implemented, where replicas of messages
are not created [22], and hence resource management is
less important. This basic protocol acts as a building
block for more advanced anycast routing techniques.
6.1 Anycast Routing and Attacks
One prominent building block for routing in DTNs is
direct delivery, where a node simply holds a message un-
til it comes in contact with the destination of that mes-
sage. This building block allows for a store-and-carry
approach to DTN routing and can even act as a very basic
stand alone protocol. Similarly, a popular building block
for anycast routing is to perform direct delivery to des-
tination groups instead of destination nodes. This very
simple protocol stores and carries all messages, which
are destined for a group rather than a node, until it meets
a target group member. Since the message was success-
fully delivered (at least in the eyes of the deliverer) to the
group, delivery is consider successful.
This group-based anycast routing protocol is reliant
on the underlying group system for quick and accurate
group information and so it is interesting to see how ma-
licious nodes spreading bad group information affect the
performance of the protocol. The malicious nodes at-
tempt to perform multiple black hole attacks, where the
goal of each is an aggressive addition attack to get on as
many membership lists as possible. By getting on multi-
ple membership lists, attackers are then able to intercept
and drop messages destined for those particular groups.
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6.2 Performance Comparisons
The goal of this evaluation is to see how different
group membership management approaches affect the
performance of anycast routing under attack scenarios.
We implemented the basic anycast routing protocol de-
scribed above in the ONE simulator. For group mem-
bership management, we evaluate the performance of the
anycast routing protocol using each of the following ap-
proaches: MembersOnly, CopyEverything, and CopyMy-
Groups. Additionally, we implemented an oracle module
to provide a baseline that gives the routing protocol per-
fect group information at all times.
All simulations were done using the same parameters
as before, except with a total of 150 nodes and groups
of size 50− A/3, where A is the number of attackers.
Messages are sourced from random non-malicious nodes
and are destined for a particular group, ensuring that the
group is different from the group of the message source.
Every node sources a single message at a random time
during every 200 second interval. Each message is 50kB
in size, and buffers are large enough to hold all mes-
sages. Message delivery ratio, the metric used, is the total
number of messages successfully delivered over the total
number of messages sourced in the network. Every data
point is the average of 10 runs.
By utilizing MembersOnly, the group-based anycast
routing protocol achieves an approximately 8% over cur-
rent group approaches during some attack scenarios (see
Figure 6). Furthermore, since the vulnerability window
is relatively small during a low to moderate attack level,
malicious nodes had trouble getting on more than a few
local membership lists. Hence, MembersOnly performs
very close to optimal much longer than other protocols
in this environment. Conversely, in both CopyEverything
and CopyMyGroups, attackers are quickly able to com-
promise many membership lists, and hence significantly
hurt routing performance.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Groups are inherent to DTNs, where much of the com-
munication and mobility patterns are based on human in-
teraction and social paradigms. Utilizing grouping in-
formation can enhance communication in these environ-
ments [10]. Unfortunately, due to the high level of dis-
connectivity and untrustworthy environments, distribut-
ing group membership information is a difficult problem.
In this paper, we have presented MembersOnly, a local
and robust group propagation and consolidation protocol
that both quickly and accurately distributes group mem-
bership lists, even in the presence of multiple malicious
nodes. We have shown via analysis and simulation that
MembersOnly can withstand multiple types of attacks
while still delivering membership lists quickly. Finally,
we have shown that even the most basic routing protocol
can gain a performance advantage when using Member-
sOnly over existing protocols.
In the future, we plan to extend our research of groups
in DTNs in three directions. First, we plan to inves-
tigate automated group creation. By analyzing trends
in mobility and communication patterns, many types of
groups, including social and geographic, can be auto-
matically detected. This helps minimize user interaction
and, when used in conjunction with MembersOnly, gives
routing protocols more forwarding options. Second, to
improve the attack resistance of MembersOnly even fur-
ther, we plan to utilize past information to help detect
and limit malicious behavior in a network. For instance,
if a node continuously disagrees with the vast majority
of other nodes, this should raise suspicion and any infor-
mation that node propagates should be weighted accord-
ingly. Third, we plan to investigate more advanced group-
based routing, including unicast, anycast, and multicast.
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